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Abstract
It is well documented that people would remunerate fair behaviours and penalize
unfair behaviours. It is argued that individuals’ reactions following the receipt of a gift
depend on the perceived intentions of the donors. Fair intentions should prompt
positive affect, like gratitude, triggering cooperative behaviours; while intended
unfairness should trigger negative affect, like anger, fostering anti-social actions. It is,
however, contended that when people lack information to infer others’ intention they
may use ‘normative’ beliefs about fairness - what a typical fair individual ‘should’ do in
these circumstances – to guide their behaviour. In this experiment we examined this
assertion. We had 122 participants play a one-shot, double-anonymous game with
half playing as potential helpers (P1s) and half as recipients (P2s). Whether a
participant was a P1 or P2 was chance-determined and all participants knew this.
P1s decided whether to help P2s and whether to make their help unconditional (no
repayment needed) or conditional (full or ‘taxed’ repayment). P2s decided whether to
accept the offer and whatever conditions attached but were blind to the list of helping
options available to P1s. We anticipated that recipients would refer to the ‘injunctive
norm’ that ‘fair people should help ‘‘for free’’ when it is only by chance that they are in
a position to help’. Therefore, without knowing P1s’ different helping options,
unconditional offers should be rated by recipients as fairer than conditional offers,
and this should be linked to greater gratitude with greater gratitude linked to greater
reciprocation. Path analyses confirmed this serial mediation. The results showed that
recipients of unconditional offers, compared to conditional ones, interpreted the
helpers’ motives asmore helpful, experienced greater gratitude andwere more eager
to reciprocate. The behavioural data further revealed that, when given a latter option
to default, 38% of recipients of conditional offers did so.
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Introduction
The ‘reciprocity rule’ stipulates that ‘we should attempt to repay, in kind, what
another person has provided us (pp.20)’ [1]. Fehr and colleagues [2–4] further
make a distinction between the tendency to remunerate (or be cooperative with)
fair behaviours (positive reciprocity), and the tendency to punish (or be hostile
towards) acts we perceive as unkind or unfair (negative reciprocity). Positive
reciprocity is often mediated by the perceived trustworthiness of the donor [5, 6]
and negative reciprocity via negative emotions such as anger directed towards the
transgressor [7, 8].
The above suggests that when an individual decides whether to penalize or
reward a partner the attribution of the partners’ intentions is crucial [9]. Indeed
Falk and Fischbacher [10] argue that reciprocation (or retaliation) is dependent
upon the recipient’s evaluation of the donor’s intention. As such, reciprocity
constitutes more than a recipient’s knee-jerk reaction, as the beneficiary also
ponders why he/she was offered what they were.
Greenberg and Westcott [11] argued that a pro-social gesture which implies
good intentions on behalf of the donor should elicit positive emotions such as
gratitude in the recipient towards the donor [12–15], and these positive emotions
can motivate reciprocation [16–19]. Indeed, Nowak and Roch [20] have argued
that gratitude is a key emotion to sustain both direct and indirect reciprocation.
The corollary of this is that unfair acts that are perceived to reflect malicious
intentions should elicit negative emotions such as indebtedness and anger
[21, 22]. Indebtedness is an aversive psychological state of tension [23] that is
associated with action tendencies [24] like inhibition (e.g. to ‘feel like shutting
myself off from my surroundings’) and avoidance (e.g. ‘to feel like ignoring my
friend’ (pp.229)) [25].
While people attend to others’ intentions they ‘do not attribute good or bad
intention in a vacuum (pp.112)’, as Bicchieri [26] contended ‘an intention is only
good or bad against background of expectations (pp.112)’. These expectations
constitute, amongst other things, the ‘injunctive norm’ about what one ‘ought to
do’ in a given situation [27–29]. Indeed, the idea that injunctive norms are the
basis of fairness judgment forms the basis of many models of social cooperation
[30–33].
In the present paper we endeavoured to examine this idea using a one-shot
variant of the trust game. Particularly, in this game 1) all players were anonymous
to one another and the experimenters (thereby avoiding any incentives to build
reputations); 2) players interacted in dyads with one being a potential helper (P1
hereafter) and the other playing a potential recipient (P2 hereafter), 3) who ended
up as either P1 or P2 in every pair, was by pure chance thus removing any
attributions about ability; and 4) P2s were completely unknowledgeable about the
options P1s had available to them. P1s could offer unconditional help (ask for no
repayment, and P2s could not repay) or conditional help (full repayment of
repayment with tax). Thus, under these conditions, P2s could only rely on their
beliefs of what people ‘ought’ to do in this context – their injunctive norm [34] –
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as the basis of judging how fair (or unfair) P1 was with respect to the offer they
made.
Thus we examined whether the difference in the types of helping offered
(unconditional vs. conditional) would be sufficient to induce different attribu-
tions of fairness in recipients towards the helper. The null hypothesis would state
that in the absence of any information about the options open to the helpers, all
help, conditional or otherwise, would be perceived as equally fair. Alternatively, it
is plausible to hypothesize that individuals make use injunctive ‘norms’ (i.e. how
people ought to behave) of fairness. When somebody’s good fortune is acquired
by chance, rather than the owner having to earn the ‘Property Rights’ [33, 35] or
the ‘Entitlement’ [31, 36] to that money, then in general ‘fair’ individuals should
help others and help unconditionally. This hypothesis is supported by evidence in
social psychology, social cooperation and behavioural economics [37–40]. As
such, we anticipated a difference in attributions of helpers’ intentions to be fair,
even in the absence of any knowledge about the choices facing the donor, purely
on the basis of whether the offer is conditional or not. That is, regardless of not
knowing the options available (to their helpers), P2s will make use of an
injunctive normative belief that fair people will help for free when that help is easy
to implement and when the helpers’ potency to help was ‘assigned’ (via chance)
instead of ‘earned’.
As well as hypothesizing that an unconditional offer would trigger a favourable
appraisal of the donor’s intentions, compared to a conditional one; we also
believed that this would generate a greater level of gratitude [41, 42]. We further
expect that this gratitude would translate to an increased willingness for the
recipients to reciprocate in the future [43, 44]. A conditional offer, on the
contrary, would not only elicit a more unfavourable evaluation of the donors’
intent but also reduced desire to reciprocate [41], with this related to one’s
decisions to default on his/her agreement (e.g., not returning the donation) [45].
Thus we test a serial multiple mediation model [46] which explores if the effect of
offer conditionality (unconditional vs. conditional) on reciprocity tendency is
mediated serially by two psychological processes: (1) initial attributions that the
donor genuinely intend to be helpful and (2) feelings of gratitude.
Methods
Participants
One hundred and twenty-two students from University of Nottingham
participated in the experiment (72 were females, mean age: 21.8 years, SD53.7
years). Each participant was paid an inconvenience allowance of £2 (US$53.27)
and was given an opportunity to earn up to £3.50 (US$55.72) more.
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Game and its Rationale
The experiment was a modified trust game conducted using Z-Tree [47]. To begin
with each participant was given a fair die to roll and was seated in a separate
cubicle. Experimental session took place with groups of 4 to 10 participant, with
participants in each session randomly assigned to play in dyads, with one
participant being the potential donor (P1) and the other playing a potential
recipient (P2).
Each player was initially endowed with 150 money-equivalent ‘Bonus Points’
and was told that he/she needed at least 50 points more to reach the ‘Bonus
Threshold’ (i.e. 200) to claim extra money (i.e. the bonus). We allocated the initial
endowments this way to create a situation in which all players were, to begin with,
equal in the sense that they were all entitled to no additional bonuses as their
initial bonus points stood at 150. It was made clear to every participant that each
bonus point would be worth one penny (US$50.17 cents) but only when he/she
made the 200 point threshold was he/she entitled to any bonus. The only way to
reach that threshold, as we told our participants, was by rolling a fair, six-sided die
once. The possible payoffs were a loss of –50 points, 0 points, and gains of 50, 100,
150, and 200 points depending on the number on the dice.
However, it was emphasized that a larger number on the dice did not guarantee
a more favourable allocation of bonus points. The purpose of this die-rolling
arrangement was to lead the participants to believe that what segregated the
‘winners’ (i.e. hitting the threshold) from the ‘losers’ (i.e. missing the threshold)
was better luck instead of ability. Every participant then learned that in this game
he/she had a ‘partner’, who was unidentifiable and anonymous. They were
reminded that ‘neither joint effort nor competition with your partner is needed’.
Nevertheless, the participants’ scores were pre-determined. Regardless of the
actual die-roll, P1s always received a ‘Die-rolling’ score 200 (thus they ended up
with 350 points: their initial 150 + 200) that exceeded the 200 point threshold,
while P2s would always fall short of the 200 point threshold. Half the P2s (N530)
ended up with a final total of 100 bonus point (that is their initial 150 minus 50
points form the dice roll) and the other P2s (N531) ended up with 150 points
(that is their initial 150 plus zero from the dice roll). This difference between the
P2s was aimed to manipulate the potential cost of helping for the P1s. The P2s
with 100 point were in the ‘High-Cost’ helping condition, and would require
twice the magnitude of their partners’ (or potential helpers’) minimum
‘donations’ (i.e. 100) compared to the ‘Low-Cost’ recipients with a 150 points (i.e.
50), to reach the 200 point threshold. Each player then learned about his/her
payoff and that of his/her partner.
At this point both P1s’ and P2s’ provided attributions regarding their partners’
Die-rolling scores. Specifically they indicated if they thought that their partners’
scores were due to (1) Luck (‘To what extent you think that your partner’s High
(Low) score is attributable to his/her good (bad) luck), and (2) Ability (‘To what
extent you think that your partner’s High (Low) score is because of his/her
capability (incompetence)’). Both items were measured using 7-point Likert type
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scales (15‘Not At All’ and 75‘Completely’). In so doing we checked if our
participants perceived their partners’ (good or bad) outcomes as chance-
determined rather than ‘earned’.
‘Free’ versus ‘Charged’ Offers
Helper’s Decisions. P1s, who were better off financially than P2s, were then asked
if they would help P2s by transferring part of their excess bonus points (i.e. 350 –
200 ‘Bonus Threshold’5150 points). Donors could help either unconditionally
(i.e. to give away the points as a gift and expect no repayment: repayment free
offer), or conditionally by applying a ‘repayment clause’ for the amount donated.
If a P1 chose to offer conditional help, he/she was asked to pick a level of
repayment as the ‘repayment clause’ for his/her recipient (Fig. 1). All these
decisions were made privately and P2s were totally blind to the list of choices that
were available to P1s.
Recipients’ Reactions
After P1s made the decisions their P2 partners were shown, firstly, whether P1s
decided to help; and if so, whether the offers were conditional or unconditional
and if they were conditional what the repayment requirements were (P2s were
never aware that P1s had the choice to make offers either conditional or
unconditional, they just saw the offer that P1 decided on). P2s who received an
offer were then asked to decide whether to accept it or not. It was made clear to
them that the P2s would always be financially better off by any offer of help
compared to no offer of help. We then assessed recipients’ perception of their
donors decisions using the following constructs: (1) State Annoyance (‘I am
annoyed by my partner’s decision.’), (2) State Gratitude (Average of items ‘I am
thankful for my partner’s decision’ and ‘I feel grateful for what my partner does
for me’, Cronbach’s a50.931), (3) State Indebtedness (‘I feel indebted to my
partner’), (4) Obligation (‘I feel obliged to repay my partner’), (5) Perceived
Genuine Helpfulness (‘My partner’s transfer is motivated by his/her sincere desire
to help me’), (6) Perceived Reasonableness (‘My partner’s decision is reasonable’),
and (7) Reciprocating Tendency (‘I am eager to help my partner out if he/she is in
need in the near future’). All were measured using 7-point Likert type scales
(where 15‘Not At All’ and 75‘Completely’).
We checked that the recipients of conditional offers understood the game and
that they were always better off economically accepting (rather than declining) the
offers, even if they fulfilled the repayment. P2s who accepted their conditional
offers were then shown a reminder of their expected repayment. Immediately after
that reminder P2s decide whether to repay and how much (Fig. 2). Importantly
by giving P2s the freedom to decide whether to honour the agreement we created
the option of defaulting in terms of a ‘breach of contract’ [48]. P2s (who received
conditional offers) were initially unaware of this latter option to default, when
making their emotional judgements so as not to confound their emotional
judgements, which are the primary outcome in this study, and make these
The Role of Perceived Fairness and Gratitude in Cooperations
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judgements comparable to the unconditional condition where there is no option
to repay. P2s who received unconditional offers were not given a latter option to
repay the ‘free’ gift. This was to reflect the real world situation whereby a free gift
from a stranger without the option to repay (e.g., altruistic living organ donation,
blood donation) would remain as such. However, when there is an explicit
expectancy to repay there is always the implicit fear for the donor (P1s) that the
recipient will default with a ‘breach of contract’ even if that was not their initial
intention. Thus by offering the recipients an opportunity to penalise their ‘donors’
for their repayment request, we provided a behavioural measure of positive (full
repayment) and negative reciprocity (zero back-transfer or partial repayment) and
the level of default gives a behavioural index of how the recipients (who accepted
their conditional offers) valued the violation on the injunctive norm. Thus the
option to show defecting behaviour provides a secondary outcome and one that
does not bias the initial emotional judgements.
Fig. 1. The flow of decisions made by a potential helper (Player 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.g001
Fig. 2. The flow of decisions made by a potential recipient (Player 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.g002
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In this game P1s’ final payoffs were affected by their P2 partners’ actual
acceptance and repayment decisions. That is, any cooperation or defaulting by P2s
would directly impact on their respective P1 partners’ final payoffs. All of the P2s’
decisions (e.g. acceptance, repayment) were fed back to their P1 partners.
Afterwards, all participants were shown onscreen their respective compensations.
We then asked all participants to complete the Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale (MCSD, [49]). In so doing we intended to address any potential
validity concerns attributable to Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) [50, 51].
That is people trying to present their self-report responses in a favourable manner
[52]. The session ended here and the participants were debriefed and paid.
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the ethics committee of the School of Psychology at
the University of Nottingham, and all participants were older than 17 and all gave
written informed consent prior to participation as approved by the ethics
committee (Approved 11th Feb, 2013; Ref. Code: 267).
Results
Pre-offer Ratings
Both P1s and P2s agreed that their partners’ die-rolling outcomes were chance-
instead of ability-governed. See S1a Table and S1b Table in S1 Supporting
Information, for further details. These attributional tendencies were not
influenced by (1) gender, (2) participants’ assigned role (P1s vs. P2s) and (3)
assigned cost conditions. Meanwhile, a paired-samples T-Test indicated a
significant difference, (t (121)514.82, p,.001), between participants’ average
‘Chance’ (M: 5.04) and ‘Ability’ attributions (M: 1.59). This suggested that
participants in this game were generally more inclined to interpret their partners’
good (or mis-) fortune to chance rather than to ability.
Offers Made, Post-offer Ratings and Socially Desirable
Responding (SDR) Measures
There were 49 P2s (80%) who received an offer and of these 24 received a
conditional (10 received a ‘Full Repayment’, 8 a ‘Partial Repayment’ and 6 an
‘Interest Repayment’ offer) and 25 an unconditional offer. While there was one
instance of rejection among the recipients of unconditional offers (rejection rate:
1/2554%: 96% acceptance), three recipients of conditional offers declined theirs
(rejection rate: 3/24512.5%: 87.5% acceptance). Neither cost of helping nor
gender significantly differentiated (1) the number of P1s who agreed to help
(conditionally or unconditionally, N549), (2) the conditionality of offers P1s
made, (3) helpers’ (N549) preferred repayment options and (4) P2s’ (N561) the
post offer ratings. See S2a Table & S2b Table in S2 Supporting Information, and
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S3a Table and S3b Table in S3 Supporting Information for details. As such, we
collapsed findings from both cost conditions and genders for the present analysis.
Independent samples T-Tests were conducted to examine if the conditionality
of offer alone, elicited differential emotions toward donors and interpretations of
donors’ intent in recipients. As illustrated in Table 1, recipients of unconditional
offers reported (1) more gratitude (p,.05), (2) that the donors were genuinely
more helpful (p,.05), and (3) a higher tendency to reciprocate (p,.01) in future
exchanges.
A serial multiple mediator model was specified [46] (Fig. 3). This model
examines if the effect of offer conditionality on reciprocity tendency is mediated
serially by (1) the degree that the donor was perceived as genuinely helpful and (2)
the recipients level of gratitude. We adopted the Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
(CI) approach as we analyse the hypothesized path model. Hayes [53] argued that
bootstrapping is ‘particularly useful relative to normal approach (i.e. the Sobel test
[54]) in smaller samples (pp.110)’ as it better handles the non-normality (or
irregularity) of the sampling distribution (of the indirect effects under scrutiny)
which is inherent in smaller samples, thus rendering ‘a test with higher power
(pp.106)’. The results are presented in Table 2 and Fig. 3. The results show that
the conditionality of an offer indirectly influenced the recipients’ tendency to
reciprocate through its effect on attributions of helpfulness and gratitude towards
the donor. Recipients receiving an unconditional offer were more prone to
perceive their donor (helper) as genuinely helpful (a150.675, p,.05), and
therefore reported more gratitude (d2150.412, p,.01). This elevated gratitude
predicts a greater eagerness to reciprocate (b250.455, p,.001). A bias-corrected
bootstrap CI for this total indirect effect (a1d21b250.675*0.412*0.45550.1266)
based on 5,000 samples did not include zero (0.0119 to 0.3682), indicating a
statistically significant indirect effect [55]. Additional analyses indicated that
receiving an unconditional offer indirectly influenced gratitude through
attributions of helpfulness, (the bootstrap CI for this effect (a1d21) did not include
zero (0.0266 to 0.5867). Meanwhile, there was no evidence that (1) receiving an
unconditional offer influenced reciprocity tendency directly (c’50.2857, p5.188),
or that (2) receiving an unconditional offer influenced reciprocity indirectly
through gratitude only, as the bootstrap CI for this indirect effect (a2b2) included
zero (–0.1437 to 0.6326).
Associations of Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) scores with
the main study variables revealed no significant correlations with most of the
recipients’ ratings and donors’ helping decisions. See S4a Table and S4b Table in
S4 Supporting Information, for details. This suggested that social desirability
response set did not have substantially contaminated the current analysis.
Behavioural Data
Twenty-one recipients who had accepted their conditional offers were asked to
repay. Of all these 21 recipients eight (i.e. 38.1%) defaulted by either repaying
partially or nothing, while the rest (N513, 61.9 %) all repaid fully as agreed.
The Role of Perceived Fairness and Gratitude in Cooperations
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Interestingly, scrutiny of these eight defaulters response revealed one instance of
zero repayment, while the rest (N57) on average repaid 58.4% of their expected
repayment. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranked test demonstrated a significant discre-
pancy, (Z52.53, p5.012), between the defaulter’s ‘Expected Repayment’ (M:
86.6) and his/her ‘Actual Repayment’ (M: 38.9). This suggested that a significant
level of defaulting occurred among these conditional recipients and that is
attributable to those 8 defaulters. There was, however, no evidence that the level of
conditionality influenced the number of P2s who (1) accepted (or declined) their
conditional offers, and (2) repaid fully or defaulted (See S5 Table in S5 Supporting
Table 1. Statistics for P2s’ post-offer ratings.
Types of offer received
Unconditionala Conditionalb
t-
statistic df
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference
State Annoyance 1.729 37.9 1.40
(0.71)
1.88
(1.15)
0.475 0.275
State Gratitude 2.046* 47 6.30
(1.27)
5.63
(1.02)
0.675 0.330
State Indebtedness 0.895 47 4.96
(1.72)
4.46
(2.19)
0.502 0.561
Perceived Partner
Genuine Helpfulness
2.014* 47 5.80
(1.19)
5.13
(1.15)
0.675 0.335
Obligation to Repay 1.828 47 4.44
(1.73)
5.33
(1.69)
0.893 0.489
Reasonableness of
P1s’ Decisions
1.817 47 4.72
(1.62)
5.46
(1.18)
0.738 0.406
Perceived Low
Cost of Help
1.880 47 3.76
(1.79)
4.67
(1.58)
0.907 0.482
Reciprocating Tendency 2.736** 38.6 6.28
(0.79)
5.46
(1.25)
0.822 0.300
Note. aN525. bN524. df5Degree of Freedom.
*p,.05 (two-tailed);
**p,.01 (two-tailed).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.t001
Fig. 3. A statistical diagram of the serial multiple mediator model for the Donor Intent Perception. Legends: Note. N549; n.s.5Not Significant;
*p,.05; **p,.01; ***p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.g003
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Information for details). This indicated that whether the recipients of conditional
offers were treated relatively more ‘harshly’ over one another neither elicited (1)
more acceptances or rejections of offers, nor (2) more cooperation or defecting.
Discussion
The present data illustrated that conditionality of an offer of help alone, when the
recipient is not aware of the options open to the helper, can significantly influence
how recipients interpreted the helpers’ intentions, as well as the recipients’ feelings
of gratitude, and their tendency to be willing to reciprocate. The results show that
the greater the perceptions of the donors’ intentions to be helpful (influenced by
conditionality of the offer) the greater the level of gratitude towards them, and
resulting in a greater tendency to reciprocate. Furthermore, the behavioural data
revealed that when recipients received a conditional offer, nearly 40% of them (8
out of 21) acted uncooperatively despite acceptance, either giving less than they
agreed or defecting completely. This indicated that people, albeit lacking
awareness of the options open to donors, still made differential judgments based
solely on whether they received a conditional or unconditional offer. We interpret
this as an example of the use of injunctive normative beliefs about fairness. That
is, in the absence of all information about the donor, recipients could only infer
their donors’ intent to be helpful with reference to the normative beliefs about
what an average ‘fair’ individual should do when their opportunity to be in a
position to help was determined by chance.
Furthermore, analyses show that people’s tendency to want to reciprocate when
treated fairly and be less cooperative when treated less fairly in a normative sense,
is, in part, dependent on attributional and emotional processing. People who
inferred that the donor’s intentions were good, –feel gratitude towards the donor -
were more likely to be eager to help them back in the future. Thus intentions and
gratitude are two key processes that help account for the link between
conditionality of offers and willingness to reciprocate. Importantly, these results
Table 2. Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Model Summary Information for the Donor Intent Perception Serial Multiple Mediator Model.
Consequent
M1 (Perceived Partner
Genuine Helpfulness, PGH) M2 (State Gratitude, Gs)
Y (Tendency to
Reciprocate, Rec)
Antecedent Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
X(Cond*) a1 .675 .335 .0497 a2 .397 .316 .215 c’ .286 .214 .188
M1(PGH) — — — d21 .412 .132 .003 b1 .339 .097 .0010
M2(Gs) — — — — — — b2 .455 .098 ,.0001
Constant iM1 4.45 .533 ,.001 iM2 3.12 .759 ,.001 iY .876 .591 .145
R25.080 R25.243 R25.622
F (1,47)54.058, p5.0497 F (2,46)57.368, p5.0017 F (3,45)524.71, p,.001
Note. *Conditionality: ‘1’denotes receipt of a conditional offer while ‘2’ denotes receipt of an unconditional offer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.t002
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show that injunctive normative beliefs about fairness are important with respect
to intentions [29, 32] and emotional responses associated with cooperation and
reciprocation [14, 16]. That is, our recipients had no knowledge about who their
helpers were, what their helpers had done in the past, would never meet them and
crucially knew nothing about the choices of offer that were open to the helpers. All
they knew was that their helpers’ good fortune to be in a position to help was by
pure chance. Consistent with the idea that under these circumstances people
should act generously and help for free, we show clearly that when this is not the
case and conditions are imposed by some helpers the recipients view these helpers
as less genuinely helpful, feel less gratitude and are less likely to want to
reciprocate to them. The lack of willingness to reciprocate resonates with the
indirect reciprocation literature which shows that we prefer to help ‘kind’ people
with a good reputation [56, 57]. Here we show that reputation can be inferred
from very minimal information – the conditionality of help only.
While only a relatively small fraction of recipients received conditional offers a
non-negligible percentage (38%) of them still showed uncooperative behaviour,
and interestingly all but one of these defectors chose to be somewhat ‘altruistic’ by
repaying the majority of their obligated repayment. It is, important to investigate
the psychological or situational factors that motivate someone to engage in this
kind of ‘impure’ free-riding or ‘cheap-riding’ [58–60]. Such cheap-riding may
reflect dissatisfaction with the donors, the actual value the recipients place on the
offer or perhaps a means to irk the donors by deliberately underpaying on their
agreed repayment. This reduced payback has been documented before in trust
games when the recipient knew a priori that the helper could have decided not to
make their investment conditional (or punishable) [7]. Here we observe the same
behaviour in the absence of this knowledge. This has been interpreted as evidence
for ‘strong reciprocity’ [7, 61]. But why pay back at a reduced level at all? The
recipients in our study, if they wanted to, could have kept all the money (the
situation was anonymous with no repercussions); however, it appears that they
chose to signal their disapproval directly to the helpers by actively under-repaying.
We interpret this as a means of giving the helpers their ‘just deserts’ and signally
disapproval designed to make the helper act more generously in the future [62].
That is, taking everything could annoy the helper and the helper may be able to
dismiss that recipient’s choice not to repay as the recipient being an ‘exception’
and not representative of others, in which case they may still offer help in the
future. It may also result in anger toward the recipient that generalizes to others
hence reduced their willingness to help in the future. Thus not repaying may have
a number of consequences. However, partial repayment signals to the helper that
they were not generous in the first place – did not observe the injunctive norm –
by indicating via partial repayment what they believed the (conditional) help was
really worth. This therefore, may serve to make the helper feel guilty. These feeling
of guilt are likely to make the helpers perhaps more cooperative in the future [63–
65]. Thus we feel that partial repayment is a means to reinforce fairness norms.
Nevertheless, at present we could not rule out any alternative perspectives (e.g. the
recipients were being nasty) that could account for partial repayment.
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There are a number of interesting observations about the unconditional offers.
First, in the context of ‘free’ gift we observe that most recipients accepted (96%
acceptance rate 24/25 for ‘free’ compared to 87.5% 21/24 for the ‘charged’ gifts)
rather that declined the ‘free’ gift because of suspicion [66] or disapproval of these
overly generous helpers [67, 68]. This may be because in the context of the
unconditional offer the helper was (1) anonymous, (2) there was by definition no
obligation to repay and (3) the helper’s good fortune to be in a position to help
was by chance.
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